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Analyzing Foreign Policy Crisis Situations:
The Bay of Pig
JOSHUA H. SANDMAN
Associate Professor of Political Scie11<e
University of New Haven

Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan. The failure at the Bay of Pigs has
received considerably less attention and study than the successfully completed, in the
perspective of United States foreign policy, Cuban missile crisis.
The Bay of Pigs fiasco however was an invaluable lesson for President John F.
Kennedy. It led him to make basic changes in his selection of advisors, his setup of
procedures for dealing with decision-making, and his formation of policy.1 The lessons the
President learned aided him in avoiding similar pitfalls and errors during the missile crisis. I
revealed to the President that he could not give his complete trust to the experts.2
In a previous study3 the author offered a prescriptive model to provide the President
with a coherent strategy and a workable decision-making pattern to deal with possible
future nuclear age crisis situations. Here, the author will offer a view of the Bay of Pigs
crisis within the analytical framework of the prescriptive model.
There are two major objectives for undertaking this study. The first objective is to
further explore the Bay of Pigs crisis. The Bay of Pigs was a prelude to the Cuban Missile
crisis. The handling of the missile crisis and the various models4 of decision-making that
have emerged from the study of that October crisis can possibly be best understood from a
more careful viewing of Bay of Pigs. The second objective is to lay the groundwork for a
comparative study of other similar crisis situations through the perspective of the
prescriptive model.
The prescriptive model has two distinct aspects. The first aspect concerns the
evolution of “general strategy” for dealing with crisis situations in the nuclear age. Each
aspect of the model has a number of components and sub-components. These various
components will be used as the illustrative tools of analysis to measure and elucidate the
Bay of Pigs operation.
Planning the Invasion
On March 17, 1960 President Eisenhower authorized a Cuban “program.” This
included “a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerilla action.” In the of Fall of

1960, the CIA recommended going beyond a guerilla and preparing a force for a
conventional invasion. An essential part of the plan was United States air cover.
The invasion plan was presented to the new President by three men held over from
the previous administration. These three men were Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA;
Richard Bissell, Jr., a Deputy Director of the CIA, who was in charge of the Cuban “program,”
and General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On January 22, 1961
Dulles and Lemnitzer outlined the plan to leading member of the Kennedy Administration.
Six days later Kennedy called his first White House meeting on what had become an
invasion plan. The President was initially “wary and reserved in his reaction” to the invasion
plan.
The late January gathering was to be the first in an ad hoc series that led to the
crucial; early April meeting at which all of the Presents key advisers gave their approval to
the invasion plan. At no time was there a full meeting of the National Security Council to
analyze and debate the plan. The President, ad Bissell played the primary roles at the
meetings. Although Bissell strongly and urgently argued for the invasion plan, the president
was reluctant to give the United States air cover. The President set the tone of the group
discussions.
The invasion, which was executed early in the morning of Monday, April 17, 1961,
without air cover, turned into a total disaster. By Wednesday the remainder of the exile
brigade was taken captive by the Cuban Army. Kennedy blamed “gaps in intelligence plus
come errors in ship loading, timing and tactics.”5
Evolving General Strategy
The composition and formulation of the general strategy components of the
prescriptive model brings together a variety of diverse but related factors: use of a number
of different aspects of communications; a careful pacing of crisis events combined with a
controlled application of coerhcive diplomacy; flexibility, restraint, and sensitivity when
dealing with adversary; attention to international law and concern for historically defensible
positions; proper regard in dealing with allies; and effective crisis supervision and coordination. An analysis of general strategy development during the Bay of Pigs operation
through the lens of the prescriptive model follows.
Communications Component
Communications during the Bay of Pigs operation was not handled well. The basic
fault was the dismantling of the NSC and the withdrawal of air cover from the plan.
Channels of communications were not open or improved and the number of parties that
were aware of or contributing information to the plan was severely limited.6 The CIA’s tight
control of the operation kept the President and the Cuban exile group basically

“uninformed of each other’s thinking” and led to the rejection of “clear evidence of Castro’s
political and military strength which was available from British and State Department
intelligence and even from newspaper stories.” Essentially, communication about the
operation was flowing from one group within the CIA that had used the problem of
maintain secrecy to limit information, analysis, examination, and investigation of the
invasion plan from various potential sources and channels.
Pacing Crisis Events Component
The pacing of crisis events was not well laid out and no real attempt was made to
use “coercive diplomacy.” The CIA people pushed for an end of April invasion. They offered
multiple reasons for the necessity of an early invasion – new Soviet arms shipments to
Castro, the start of the rainy season, pressure from the Guatemalan planter who was
harboring the exile force, etc. Further, during and following the invasion itself any efforts to
better pace crisis events were soon negated by the reality that the President had not
properly led the invasion scenario. There was no real opportunity to properly pace the
quickly unfolding disaster at the Bay of Pigs. Following the defeat Kennedy sent for
Eisenhower, who asked whey air cover had not been given the invasion. Kennedy
responded, “…the Soviets would be very apt to cause trouble in Berlin.” Eisenhower
responded, “That is exactly the opposite of what would really happen.”7
Following the abortive attack the Cubans were treated with greater sensitivity.
Kennedy displayed flexibility and restraint following the invasion in dealing with the Cubans.
He would not be pressured or coerced into ordering a full-scale attack on Cuba when it
became evident that the invasion plan had failed. Further, he order the “cancellation” of an
attack against the Cuban Air Force which he believed would lead to severe political
problems for the United States in the world community.8
International Law and Morality
President Kennedy could find little international law of moral justification for the
invasion. Some arguments could be made for an historical and moral obligation to the
Cuban people and exile fighters. However, it could not be easily presented to the world
community in an acceptable fashion, it could not be seen as in accord with international
law, and it could not be reconciled with our traditional concern for historically and morally
defensible behavior in the international arena.
Dealing with Allies
There was a failure to properly deal with our allies. They were not consulted and
their counsel was not solicited. Our Latin neighbors and our European alliance partners
were rather peripheral to the entire operation. There was no opportunity to receive a

possible assessment or analysis of the Bay of Pigs invasion plan from our allies that could
have provided us with a contrary or critical view of the proposed undertaking.
Crisis Supervision and Coordination
Crisis supervision and coordination proved to be most difficult for the President.
Kennedy was distressed by the “gap” between decision and execution, between planning
and reality. He was disturbed on finding that at such a high level of government, dangerous
errors in the entire decision-making and execution structure should exist.
The President was led to believe certain things about the invasion that turned out to
be false. There proved to be substantial differences between what he actually approved
and what in reality occurred. He thought he was approving a “quiet reinfiltration” of
Cubans back to their country. In reality the invasion was being highly publicized and
overplayed. Kennedy believed that the exile group had been informed that the invasion
would have to take place without American military support. In reality the CIA contacts to
the exile army were telling the soldiers that American military intervention would come if it
were necessary. Further, President Kennedy had been assured that the immediate area
around the Bay of Pigs was suited for guerrilla warfare. In fact the area was swampy, well
covered by Castro’s army, and, as later become known, the exile soldiers did not have the
necessary guerrilla training.
The President did not have trusted and well informed aides maintaining close
supervision of the invasion and crisis scenario. There was little control of and coordination
between those who were planning and carrying out the invasion and those who were
making policy decisions. The Kennedy administration was “not yet fully organized” for crisis
management, knew little of those in the CIA who had planned and were no strongly
advocating the invasion, and was severely constrained by time and secrecy conditions. The
administration never attained the necessary measure of control and supervision of the Bay
of Pigs operation.9
Developing a Decision-Making Pattern
Crisis in the nuclear age requires that a President and those involved in decisionmaking establish a decision-making pattern that can deal with the complex and stressful
decision-making situation they face. The decision-making components of the model join
together a group of aspects intended to meet the needs of the President and the other
decision-makers. These aspects include – selecting a proper decision-making management
style; composing a decision-making body; putting this decision-making body in operation to
achieve the best possible interpretation of information, analysis, assessments, diagnosis,
diversity of views, etc.; and achieving maximum intergovernmental coordination between

the various actors, agencies, and branches of government somehow involved with the crisis
and the implementation of crisis policy.
Decision-Making Management Style
The “collegial” style of decision-making management – which places emphasis on
bringing together the best aspects of diverse points of view and approaches – was not
employed in the Bay of Pigs operation. President Kennedy’s advisers spoke “virtually with
one voice.” There was little effort to air or review the basic underlying assumptions of the
invasion plan or to hammer out whether the invasion plan was the best response to dealing
with the problem of Cuba. There was rather, an intense effort by its advocates to win
approval of the invasion plan. Further, the President felt that there was a pronounced
failure of responsibility by the State Department to debate or define the political
considerations or consequences of the plan.10
Composition of the Decision-Making Body Component
The composition of the decision-making group was essentially “ad hoc” but
dominated by intelligence and military experts who had an emotion and organizational
commitment to their invasion plan. Kennedy knew little of the strengths and weaknesses of
the men who were advising him. The secrecy imposed on the deliberations had the impact
of limiting the number of people who knew of the operation or who would subject the
invasion plan to a thorough analysis or investigation. The President was not able to go
outside the ad hoc decision-making body to seek advice or assistance. It was only one
element within the CIA and to an extent the joint chiefs that had the “opportunity to study
and ponder the invasion plan.” The decision-making group was limited and lacked
flexibility. It was “wrong” for Kennedy to anticipate that the group with the CIA advocating
the invasion plan would “provide the necessary objectivity and skepticism about their own
plan.”13
Operations of the Decision-Making Body Component
The operations of the decision-making body was marked by the lack of “multiple
advocacy” and by the presence of the “group think” phenomenon. The invasion plan
“grew, changed and forced decisions without any clear statement of policy or procedure.”
There were no strong or organized voices of “opposition” raised at any of the “key”
meetings and “no realistic alternatives were presented.”12 There was little “skepticism”
expressed and the President did not make “clear” that the “courage” of those on his staff
that might oppose the plan should not be called into question by the advocates of the plan.
Other tracks of advisory reasoning and thinking were never explored and the
decision-making body displayed little flexibility. Roger Hilsman notes that his “personal
lesson” from the Bay of Pigs experience was that a responsible government official should

not have to “ask to be permitted” to conduct a study of a Bay of Pigs type operation. The
“excessive” security restrictions imposed by the CIA severely limited the information and
analysis flow to the Presidents advisers and decreased their ability to make sound
judgments. The CIA and State Department were “without benefit of advice” from their own
intelligence staffs. Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy Director of the CIA for Intelligence, who
was responsible for “intelligence, research and estimates, was not informed of the invasion
plan. The decision-makers were therefore “denied the judgment of CIA’s own estimates on
the research side of the operation.”13
Inter-Government Coordination Component
The President had difficulty with intergovernmental coordination. Kennedy felt that
the military had only made a superficial review of critical, military related aspects of the
invasion plan. When the staging area had been changed from the City of Trinidad to the
Bay of Pigs they did not inform the President of their reservations. The invasion plan
centered around the CIA, the Joint Chiefs, lacking responsibility for the plan, did not appear
to apply the same rigid, critical examination it applied to its own projects.14
Those responsible for planning and carrying out the invasion plan seemed to care
little for the goals of the Kennedy Administration or the standing of the Executive Office.
They did not appear to support Kennedy and seemed to be propelled by their own
bureaucratic initiatives and organizational commitments. On the other hand, in the final
analyses, the failure of the President to have a full NSC hearing of the plans was basic in the
failure.15
Conclusion
Viewing the Bay of Pigs operation from the perspective of the prescriptive model
helps illuminate the decision-makers failure in strategy development and the inadequacy of
their decision-making structure. It also suggests ways, through application of the
components of the model, to strengthen the process of arriving at proper strategy and
organizing and operating decision-making groups during crisis.
The prescriptive model illustrates and President Kennedy appears to have learned
from the Bay of Pigs that in a future crisis he would have to be concerned with effective
communications both from within the governmental advisory system and from without. He
would also have to show more regard for the adversary and concern for the impact of
decisions and actions on United States allies. Further, the international legal structure and
the moral position of the United States could not be so fully ignored. He also came to
recognize the importance of effective supervision and coordination of crisis actions.
The model also illustrates, as Kennedy saw, that the President has to extend the
“range” of his advice and use a decision-making management style that is more oriented to

hammering out the best solution among several options. Further, the President should
make use of people of general knowledge and intelligence whom he knows personally and
has confidence in. Policy decisions in the Bay of Pigs were not placed in terms of the
objectives of the Kennedy Presidency. The “prestige of the Presidential Office has been
lightly regarded by men who primary loyalty was not to him or his administration.” Neither
Robert Kennedy nor Theodor Sorensen had been involved in any crucial meetings on the
proposed invasion. These were men Kennedy “had worked with longest, knew best and
trusted most.” On the other hand Kennedy himself admitted his failure to convene “a full
meeting of the NSC to discuss and criticize the plans.” This was the basic error.16
The model indicates that there was a strong push for in-group cohesiveness. This
stemmed, in part, from a desire to maintain established policy rather than face the hostility
of those offended by shifts in these policies. Here the model can help the President
become aware of the need to encourage more critical and independent thinking and
analysis. It can also help him realize the need for “impolite” and tough questioning on the
part of this staff to those operating the machinery of government.
It is the author’s belief that this analysis of the Bay of Pigs operation, when
combined with a study of a similar crises, can be used for comparison with the variable
components presented in the prescriptive model. This comparative analysis can be helpful
in revealing significant similarities and differences between the crises, in detailing points of
weakness and strength in the handling of each crisis, in exploring the most common
problem areas in crisis management, and in suggesting which of the variable components of
the model appear to be most important in the successful handling and resolution of a crisis
situation.
Perhaps the person who learned most from the Bay of Pigs failure was Kennedy
himself. In his meeting with Eisenhower on April 22, 1961, after the Bay of Pigs debacle,
Kennedy assured the old soldier, “I assure you that hereafter if we get in anything like this,
it is going to be success.”17
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